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INTRODUCTION
The goals of cognitive training programs resonate with us. Many of us have seen loved ones
succumb to the ravages of Alzheimer’s Disease, and others of us simply take pleasure in feeling
mentally agile or watching as our children’s minds grow seemingly overnight. We live every
day confronted by the challenges of navigating a complex world, and most of us would like to
be better at it. In many ways, scientific evidence supports the intuition that cognitive training
should work; the brain is shaped by its experiences throughout the lifespan (Kramer et al., 2004;
Markham and Greenough, 2004), and simply believing that intelligence is a malleable set of abilities
confers the benefits of motivation and learning strategies that are known to correspond to higher
performance on psychometric tests (Blackwell et al., 2007). As an academic and clinical community,
if we seek to help people reach their full cognitive potentials, what better time could there be to
bolster their abilities than during adolescence, when neurons in the brain are growing to their
peak levels of axonal myelination, and when the synaptic connections between them are rapidly
being strengthened or pared down by experience? Furthermore, how can we leverage what we
know about neuroscience and psychology to even the playing field between people at risk for the
negative developmental impacts of poverty and disease, and the more fortunate? These are among
the questions that Jacqueline Gamino and her colleagues at the UT Dallas Center for BrainHealth
have been exploring in their Strategic Memory Advanced Reasoning Training (SMART) program
(Gamino et al., 2014). These questions are also among those that will advance the fields of education
policy and aging research alike, but we recommend caution in interpreting the most recent findings
to emerge from the cognitive training field.
STRATEGIC MEMORY ADVANCED REASONING TRAINING
(SMART)
Strategic Memory Advanced Reasoning Training (SMART), as implemented in the 2014
study by Gamino et al., is a 1-month training program created with the goal of teaching
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“hierarchical cognitive strategies that support higher-order
abstraction of meaning from incoming details and world
knowledge” (Gamino et al., 2010). It focuses on verbal
comprehension for written texts, with a focus on nuanced
meaning rather than memorization of explicit details, with
seven components of instruction: “ (1) deliberate inhibition of
extraneous information; (2) chunking and organizing relevant
information; (3) inference; (4) paraphrasing; (5) synthesis of
important details; (6) interpretation of take home messages; and
(7) abstraction of deeper meanings and synthesis of the processes
in order to elicit top-down processing” (Gamino et al., 2014).
One of the ideas motivating SMART is that to be useful,
cognitive training should not involve practicing a single skill
in a narrowly-defined context with limited applicability to daily
life. This reflects one of the key criticisms of early cognitive
training games, which was the notion of limited “transfer,” or
whether gains made while practicing a video game generalized
to real-life performance (far transfer) or at least to similar
measures of the same ability (near transfer), rather than being
accounted for solely by procedural memory for the task at
hand. The SMART program addresses this concern by using
a broad training platform with similarity to real-life academic
demands as an alternative strategy to methods that involve
practicing a single skill like memory span or selective attention.
Gamino et al. also used outcome measures that were designed
to measure the skills necessary for academic success beyond
rote memorization. Instead of exhausting the search for “far
transfer” between psychometric task-based training materials
and the “tasks” encountered in real life, they created a training
protocol closer to the demands of school performance. The
advantage of this approach is that even if a program’s benefits
only go as far as “near transfer” or can even be attributed entirely
to procedural memory mechanisms in the brain, they could
be worthwhile if they help people meet their goals beyond the
training program.
LIMITATIONS IN STUDY DESIGN AND
INTERPRETATION
With the promise of reasoning training in mind, the next step is
to evaluate the state of the current evidence. The most prominent
finding in the recent study by Gamino et al. was that within the
group of students who received the cognitive training program,
they all showed similar improvements in verbal comprehension
and abstract thought regardless of their socioeconomic status
(SES); the students from families that were financially struggling
improved over the course of the intervention. While these
preliminary results should be followed up and studied further,
the following key details need to be highlighted and addressed
in future research if we aim to translate “hope for students living
in poverty” into tangible benefits.
1. The analysis showing equal gains for students living above
and below the poverty line used a statistical model adjusting
for baseline performance levels in the outcome of interest
and memory retrieval. The primary finding was the lack of
an interaction between SES and time (pre-intervention vs.
post-intervention), but it is important to note that students
living in poverty scored lower than aﬄuent students before
the intervention, and there was no evidence presented for
any closing of the achievement gap after the intervention.
In other words, students in poverty improved a presumably
similar amount from a lower baseline. Furthermore, Bayesian
statistical analysis (or at least some consideration of
standardized effect size) is more well-suited than the Neyman-
Pearson hypothesis testing framework for interpreting what
appears to be the lack of a difference between two groups (low-
SES and high-SES students having similar within-group gains)
as anything other than what we typically call “failure to reject
the null hypothesis.”
2. The control group showed a non-significant improvement
in their reasoning scores between the two assessments
while the experimental group showed statistically significant
improvements from baseline, but the authors do not report
whether there was a main effect of intervention group. By
analogy, if you (the reader) should score 101 on an IQ
test while we score 99, then you are technically above the
population average and we are below average, but this does not
say anything about whether we are reliably different from one
another without directly comparing our scores to each other
instead of against an arbitrary significance threshold.
3. The control condition itself differed systematically from
the experimental group in ways other than whether they
received the intervention or not, making comparisons
between the groups impossible. The interaction between SES
and cognitive training (or a purported lack thereof) was
thus demonstrated only within participants who received
the cognitive training intervention. The intervention was
administered to classes and schools where teachers and
the administration volunteered to have class time devoted
to the SMART program. Baseline and follow-up testing
was administered to control participants from schools (or
specific classes) that were not willing to engage in the
intervention. If willingness to participate in what is described
as a cutting-edge, neuroscience-based educational psychology
intervention is any indicator of teaching style, then there could
be systematic differences in the type of instruction students
in the experimental and control conditions were already
receiving. The control group also included a larger range of
ages and a longer period of time between the two assessments.
The authors explain that the schools participating in the
experiment required that all students be given equal access
to the intervention if it were beneficial. The well-intentioned
school administrators may not understand the need to control
intervention trials against a placebo or “treatment as usual”; if
we already knew that the intervention were better than other
educational methods in this particular context, then we would
not be testing it. In vulnerable populations who deserve access
to an intervention for which there is already building evidence,
one ethical solution to this dilemma is to offer a staggered
onset of treatment, in which the control group is assessed
without intervention (or with instruction as usual) for the
duration of the experiment before being offered the chance to
receive the intervention immediately afterward.
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4. Even if the contents of an intervention do not confer
improvement in the brain’s ability to process information or
the adoption of adaptive strategies, believing that one will
improve can change motivation, attention, or other factors that
will increase performance as well, rendering the intervention
itself unnecessary. This is reason to include a placebo-like
condition in addition to no-contact controls or “treatment as
usual” (see Boot et al., 2013, for a discussion on why even
“active control” conditions can fail to generate an adequate
placebo effect).
5. This study excluded from analysis 233 students in the
experimental group who belong to arguably the most needy
and vulnerable group among those living in poverty: those
with brain injury, learning disability, neurodevelopmental
disorder, ADHD or special education placement. Individuals
with these conditions in the control group were not excluded
from analysis. It is not possible to draw any comparison
between study groups if people with known predictors of
low performance were systematically removed from the
intervention group while being allowed to remain in the
control group. Socioeconomic status of the control group
was also abstracted from school records rather than the
family assessments given individually to students in the
intervention group. Institutional Review Boards often dictate
that vulnerable populations (e.g. those with severe learning
disabilities) be excluded from studies to protect their safety
or autonomy, but if they were enrolled in a study and
given an intervention that purports to offer hope for the
needy, then their data need to be analyzed as well. Perhaps
more importantly, if we aim to draw conclusions about how
best to intervene on the cognitively vulnerable, then the
developmentally disabled and delayed are clearly an important
part of the picture.
6. The SMART protocol was designed to provide a standardized
intervention that could be administered in a classroom,
yielding benefits for as many recipients as possible without
requiring individualized instruction. Although a generalizable
intervention of this sort could certainly prove beneficial in
terms of cost-effectiveness, the goal of generalizability should
not obscure the need to adapt teaching and training strategies
to the unique needs of each student. Some people may benefit
from educational strategies that involve bolstering their own
unique weaknesses, and others–particularly those with known
cognitive deficits–may gain more from strategies that involve
using their strengths to compensate for weaknesses. In light of
this, many in the cognitive training field are exploring the use
of adaptive interventions that are calibrated to participants’
abilities and change over the course of the intervention. If the
aforementioned populations with special needs are eventually
included in studies of interventions like SMART, we anticipate
that adaptability will be a necessary component for the success
of the intervention.
Within the educational context, the contents of the SMART
intervention appear to have high face validity, meaning that
educational psychology experts are likely to agree that the skills
targeted are those that students should be learning anyway.
The issue of opportunity costs arises when we try to generalize
beyond the classroom, however. Any time we decide to do
something, we are closing off the possibility of doing something
else; consensus indicates that time spent learning how to read
deeply is more beneficial for cognitive development than time
spent on social media or watching sitcoms on television. If
concerned parents are asking themselves what their children
should do after school, however, an open question remains:
should students do their homework as previously instructed, or
should they continue practicing materials from interventions like
SMART?We already know that physical fitness is one of the most
potent neuroprotective factors across the lifespan (Colcombe
and Kramer, 2003; Hillman et al., 2008); if families are making
decisions about how to spend their limited resources, we must be
frank about not yet having evidence that spending lots of time
and money on proprietary reasoning courses is any better for
cognitive development than joining the after-school track team
for free, where we know that they will benefit from the effects
of aerobic exercise and social engagement. It could very well be
the case that cognitive training interventions are beneficial to
cognitive development. Tomake that claim confidently, however,
more research is required. Further programmatic research on
cognitive training interventions should also enable us to answer
more specific questions concerning the “active ingredients” of
any particularly efficacious intervention, the types of cognitive
changes to expect after training, the necessary doses and any
overtraining or side effects, and the populations for which
cognitive training is likely to have a beneficial effect.
Recommendations and Conclusions
The discussion on cognitive training continues, as does the
rigorous program of research about its benefits and limitations.
The U.S. National Institutes of Health, National Science
Foundation, and the research divisions of the Departments of
Defense and Intelligence are all funding research to investigate
the efficacy of cognitive training interventions and the brain
mechanisms that support different aspects of adaptive, goal-
directed behavior. Where should they go from here? As members
of the cognitive training field who share both the optimism and
skepticism of our colleagues, we offer what we believe are several
key points to advance the field, many of which are already being
implemented by labs like those at the Center for BrainHealth:
1. Acknowledge the ambiguity of null findings, and publicize
prominent failures to reject the null hypothesis. Use Bayesian
statistics (in addition to the Neyman-Pearson and Fisher
frameworks) to evaluate the state of the evidence, especially
when trying to demonstrate that groups are equal, or that there
is no difference between two conditions.
2. Keep inmind that a failure to replicate a finding does notmean
that the original study was fraudulent, or even spurious. It only
means that if a “true” effect exists, the size of the effect and the
influence of any confounding variables is not yet clear.
3. Carefully control for factors that can be easily manipulated
by transient environmental conditions like motivation and
expectancy. Ideally, a double-blind and randomized treatment
assignment procedure would mitigate the risk of participants
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in the control group underperforming due to low expectancy,
or the risk of researchers treating them differently than the
group receiving the intervention of interest. If the control
group can not be led to believe they have a similar chance
of improving to that of the intervention group, then their
expectations of change should be measured.
4. In designing studies and randomizing participants, include
(and statistically model) variability in stable confounding
factors like developmental delay, traumatic brain injury and
ADHD.
5. Use assessment batteries that include diverse tests of cognitive
performance, such that the possibility of changes (and even
decreases) in performance after training can be measured
in cognitive domains other than the ones in which the
experimenters expect improvement.
The most striking finding reported by Gamino and colleagues is
that students are able to learn despite the environmental obstacles
to success that confront them. That is reason enough to have
hope. How much they learn, from what baseline, and under
what conditions to allow for optimum growth remains to be
determined, and we are confident that the cognitive neuroscience
and psychology community is well equipped to address these
questions.
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